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Freeman: DARWIN AND SPENCER owe little or none of their superiority to direct inheritance 
from the old Greeks, though they owe much to the written 
works of that wonderful people." Here, it will be discerned, 
not only does Darwin distinguish between heredity and 
learned repertory, but he also attributes the superiority 
in civilization of certain 19th-century "western nations of 
Europe" over their own "savage progenitors" predomi- 
nantly to elements in ancient Greek civilization which (as 
we would now say) had been culturally transmitted to them. 
As I have already shown, Darwin considered that progress 
in human societies was "no invariable rule" and, further, 
that progress depended on "many concurrent favourable 
conditions far too complex to be followed out." However, 
while thus refraining from any premature attempt to 
analyse the complex etiology of such human progress as 
had occurred, Darwin (1901 [1871] :220) was prepared to 
venture a broad general opinion as to the probable nature 
of the significant variables: "The more efficient causes of 
progress seem to consist of a good education during youth 
whilst the brain is impressible, and of a high standard 
of excellence, inculcated by the ablest and best men, 
embodied in the laws, customs and traditions of the nation 
and enforced by public opinion." Here again, Darwin 
explicitly recognized the learned repertory of a society as 
one of the "more efficient causes" of progress in civilization, 
while specifically stating that natural selection acts, in such 
conditions, "only tentatively" (p. 217) and in "a subordinate 
degree" (p. 220). 
That Darwin did indeed recognize the superordinate 
importance of what are now called cultural adaptations 
is further confirmed by his restatement, in summary, of 
his views on this issue (1901[1871]:945): 
Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still 
is, yet as far as the highest part of man's nature is concerned 
there are other agencies more important. For the moral qualities 
are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through 
the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, 
&c., than through natural selection; though to this latter agency 
may be safely attributed the social instincts, which afforded the 
basis for the development of the moral sense. 
Here, Darwin adopted, in embryonic form, what today 
would be called an interactionist position. That is, while 
acknowledging the superordinate importance of learned 
behaviour as the adaptation on which human civilization 
is founded, he at the same time recognized that some 
learned behaviour has, in part, a biological basis. Darwin's 
view thus foreshadowed the contemporary scientific para- 
digm succinctly expressed by Dobzhansky (1969:290): ". 
mankind's principal adaptive instrument is culture. Culture 
is acquired and transmitted not through genes; symbol 
formation and symbolic language are the chief modes of 
transmission. Yet this non-genetic transmission has a genetic 
foundation." 
In other words, while some of his interpretations are 
at error and require substantial revision, Darwin did recog- 
nize (and at a time when the concept of culture was in 
a rudimentary state of development) that human history 
had long since reached a phase in which learned behavioural 
adaptations had become "much more" important than 
genetic variables in determining social change, while still 
attaching importance to the nature of the brain and body 
of man as these evolved, in earlier times, predominantly 
by means of natural selection. 
As Stocking (1968:365) has shown, the propounding of 
the theory that culture is "a thing sui generis" by Kroeber, 
Lowie, and others was linked with the overthrow of "the 
Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of acquired charac- 
ters." At that time, the conceptualization of culture as a 
"closed system" (Jenks 1918:490) was seen by Lowie (1917:5) 
as "a declaration of independence against the older 'more 
general' sciences of biology and psychology." By the 1950s, 
however, the limitations of the cultural determinist para- 
digm that emerged in the wake of Kroeber's (1915) "eight- 
een professions" had become apparent; and in 1955, 
Kroeber himself gave it as his opinion (1955:198) that the 
period during which "generic human nature" had been 
discounted by the great majority of anthropologists was 
"drawing to a close." The course of events since then has 
borne out Kroeber's prediction,37 and it has now become 
evident that an authentic science of anthropology must 
be based on a paradigm that gives recognition to the 
interaction of cultural, biological, and environmental vari- 
ables in historical and contemporary situations, as during 
the evolutionary past of the human species (cf. Freeman 
1970:68). 
The modern biological theory of evolution is basic to 
such an anthropological paradigm, being in no way incom- 
patible with the recognition of the emergence of learned 
behaviour and symbolic systems as factors of ever increasing 
significance in human evolution and history. It is of impor- 
tance, therefore, that contemporary anthropologists hould 
have an accurate understanding of those concepts of Charles 
Darwin on which the modern biological theory of evolution 
is founded, and that these concepts should not be confused 
with the obsolete Lamarckian evolutionism of Herbert 
Spencer. It is hoped that this paper will be a contribution 
to that end. 
Abstract 
In this paper certain crucial differences between the evolu- 
tionary theories of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer 
are explored. Particular attention is given to the Lamarckian 
basis of Spencer's evolutionary doctrine. 
Comments 
by CARL JAY BAJEMA 
Allendale, Mich., U.S.A. 2 xi 73 
The resurgence of interest in evolutionary theories among 
anthropologists makes Freeman's paper very timely. My 
only criticism is that sometimes it doesn't go far enough. 
For example, the differing views that Spencer and Darwin 
held with respect to "progress" led to their adopting 
different definitions of evolution. Spencer was the first 
person to extend the meaning of the word evolution to 
include some of the changes in species over time. Spencer 
(1857b:446[1891a:10]) defined evolution as change in a 
particular direction-change of the simple into the complex 
("a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous"). 
Darwin (1859:171,340,443,456) essentially considered 
evolution to be any hereditary change occurring within 
a species over time ("descent with modification") regardless 
of the direction of the change. Although "evolved" is the 
last word of the first edition of On the Origin of Species, 
"Cf. Chapple (1970:viii-xv) for a listing of "the advances in 
biology and anthropology over the last twenty-five years which 
have contributed so much to the formulation of a consistent and 
integrated approach to human behaviour and to culture." 
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Darwin rarely used the term evolution in his published 
works-perhaps because Spencer had defined evolution 
as progress from the simple to the complex. Spencer's idea 
that evolution must be progressive has become so ingrained 
in the minds of some modern anthropologists that they 
have even resorted to using the term devolution to describe 
changes which lead to a decrease in complexity of organiza- 
tion (Carneiro 1972). Freeman's analysis should help make 
anthropologists more aware that not all scientists define 
evolution in the same way and that differences in definition 
lead to different conclusions. 
Second, Spencer (1864) invented the phrase "survival 
of the fittest" to describe natural selection, and Darwin 
(1869) adopted this phrase to define natural selection in 
the fifth and subsequent editions of the Origin of Species. 
This has probably led many modern scientists to believe 
that there must have been a great deal of similarity between 
the evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer. Freeman's 
paper helps dispel this misconception. Interestingly, while 
the phrase "survival of the fittest" led many people to 
the erroneous conclusion that natural selection operates 
to perpetuate the individual (longevity), both Darwin 
(1859:62) and Spencer (1864:444) understood that natural 
selection operates to bring about the multiplication (repro- 
duction) of individuals with favorable variations. 
We owe Freeman a debt of gratitude for his efforts to 
help us better understand the historical roots of some of 
the controversies that have occurred (and in some instances 
are still raging) in evolutionary anthropology. 
by JOHN BLACKING 
Belfast, Northern Ireland. 18 xi 73 
Freeman is to be congratulated on his characteristically 
thorough and scholarly examination of the evolutionary 
theories of Darwin and Spencer. Although Harris was 
justified in noting the effect of contemporary social and 
economic structures on the development of theory and 
methods in the social and natural sciences, Freeman makes 
it clear that even if Darwin published his results long after 
Spencer and Marx he had worked out his theory earlier. 
Moreover, although Darwin had been reared in a culture 
in which evolutionary ideas had been under discussion for 
over half a century, it was the array of data collected during 
the voyage of the Beagle that crystallized his thought about 
the origin of species. 
If Harris's admirably provocative book has come in for 
further attack, it is perhaps his fault for not applying his 
own principles to his writing. Why did he fall victim to 
the cult of personalities and events and use a personal 
label to describe aspects of a system that transcends individ- 
ual idiosyncracies? The term "Spencerism," like "Darwin- 
ism" or "Marxism" or any other "personal-name-ism," 
suggests dogma and invites polemic rather than scientific 
discussion, testing, and refinement. It is to be hoped that 
Freeman's timely emphasis on the modern biological theory 
of evolution as an integral part of anthropological inves- 
tigation will not cause some to dismiss altogether Harris's 
arguments about Spencer's work, or indeed several of 
Spencer's own insights and analyses which are not automat- 
ically falsified because of the faults in his evolutionary 
doctrine. 
by ROBERT L. CARNEIRO 
New York, N.Y., U.S.A. 16 xi 73 
Freeman wants us to believe that whereas Darwin was an 
illustrious scientist whose work on evolution was rigorous 
and illuminating, Spencer was merely a "fashionable publi- 
cist" whose evolutionary writings were metaphysical and 
unsound. Such a distorted view of Spencer can be sustained 
only by a very careful selection and skillful interweaving 
of a limited body of evidence. While quite properly pointing 
out certain errors in Spencer's views on organic evolution, 
Freeman nevertheless minimizes, ignores, or suppresses 
a much larger part of Spencer's evolutionism. The result 
is a serious misrepresentation of intellectual history. 
Freeman's attack centers on Spencer's belief in the inher- 
itance of acquired characteristics and on the prominent 
role he assigned to it in organic evolution. He shows quite 
correctly that in clinging to this belief in the face of mounting 
evidence against it, Spencer was dogmatic and even per- 
verse. Not content with this, however, he goes on to say 
that Spencer's social evolutionism also rested squarely on 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and that when 
this doctrine fell, his social evolutionism fell with it. But 
this contention cannot be sustained. 
According to Freeman, by 1873 Spencer had "opted for 
the theory that the mental and social evolution of the species 
Homo sapiens was primarily caused by the inheritance of 
acquired characters, producing a gradual and inevitable 
modification of human nature and human institutions." 
He adds, moreover, that this doctrine was one "to which 
Spencer became increasingly committed during the re- 
maining 30 years of his life." But as far as Spencer's social 
evolutionism is concerned, the facts show quite the opposite. 
From 1873 on, Spencer became less, rather than more, 
inclined to see social institutions as arising from changing 
attributes of human nature. 
Spencer's original belief that the institutions of a society 
were a direct reflection of the innate qualities of its members 
dates from a time when he looked at society purely as 
a moralist, that is, before he began to contemplate it from 
the standpoint of science. Thus in Social Statics he wrote 
that "every phenomenon exhibited by an aggregation of 
men, originates in some quality of man himself" (1851:16), 
and he continued to hold much the same view as late 
as 1873, when he wrote in The Study of Sociology that "the 
nature of the aggregate is determined by the nature of 
its units" (1891 c:41 1). By the 1870s, however, Spencer was 
becoming increasingly familiar with a very large body of 
cross-cultural data being collected for his use in writing 
his magnum opus, The Principles of Sociology, and this 
exposure clearly changed his thinking. Spencer now recog- 
nized that "social phenomena depend in part on the natures 
of the individuals and in part on the forces the individuals 
are subject to" (1890:14). Moreover, he saw factors external 
to individuals as ptaying an increasingly greater role as 
societies evolved. Thus he noted that "the ever-accumulat- 
ing, ever-complicating super-organic products, material and 
mental [i.e., culture], constitute a further set of factors 
which become more and more influential causes of change" 
(1890:14). Freeman totally ignores this evidence of change 
in Spencer's ideas. Though he cites no fewer than 27 of 
Spencer's works, Principles of Sociology is not among them. 
Freeman would have us believe that Spencer found 
Darwin's principle of natural selection uncongenial and 
accepted it only after he had found a way to subsume 
it under one of his own general principles. This is simply 
not true. Spencer welcomed natural selection from the start. 
Indeed, he expressed his chagrin at not having thought 
of it himself (1924:390). His Principles of Biology makes 
repeated use of natural selection, and his Principles of 
Sociology is studded with it. Over and over in the latter 
work Spencer shows that certain forms of social organization 
became widespread largely by giving some societies an 
advantage over others in the struggle for existence. 
Turning to the inevitability of progress, we find Freeman 
again quoting an early opinion of Spencer's as if it were 
his mature and final thought. True enough, Spencer once 
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